Streamlining policies for enhancing rice production in Africa: Past experiences, lessons learnt and the way forward by Akande, T et al.
African Crop Science Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp.  223 - 235   ISSN 1021-9730/2007 $4.00
Printed  in Uganda.  All rights reserved     ©2007, African Crop Science Society
- FORUM -
STREAMLINING  POLICIES  FOR  ENCHANCING  RICE  PRODUCTION  IN  AFRICA:  PAST
EXPERIENCES,  LESSONS  LEARNT  AND  THE  WAY  FORWARD
TUNJI AKANDE, YOUSSOUF CISSE  and P.  KORMAWA1
NISER, Ibadan, Nigeria
 Institut d’Economic Rurale, Bamako, Mali
1Assistant Director of Research, Africa Rice Centre (WARDA)
ABSTRACT
There is a consensus that African development confronts several challenges, which include alleviating widespread
poverty and unemployment, providing basic foods for the people, containing the HIV/AIDS pandemic, eliminat-
ing gender disparities and ensuring sustainable management of natural resources. In order to overcome the
problem of food supply, investment policies have focused on  certain commodities. Rice (Oryza sativa) has been
at the centre of particular policy attention in West Africa since the 1970s, following the formation of West Africa
Rice Development Association (WARDA). Even though substantial investments and policy actions have been
undertaken, the results belied the efforts made and expectations nursed. Africa today still depends on rice imports
at a scale never imagined and domestic rice production programmes have been largely unsuccessful. The question
is: What went wrong? Why has Africa been unable to produce enough rice to stem imports? Why did the initial
investments in irrigation schemes and programmes fail? Now that attention is on expanding rice cultivation to
other parts of Africa, what policy imperatives are essential to ensure sustainable rice production? This paper
examines these issues by drawing experiences from several countries across West Africa. The overall objective is
to provide appropriate policy framework for the expansion  and  sustainable production of rice to new areas in
Africa.   Specifically, the paper examines some of the policies pursued in the past in a number of countries and the
reasons for their ineffectiveness. Drawing on the benefits of past experiences, the paper makes proposals for
improved policy environment to support the new initiatives to increase rice output in the continent.
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RÉSUMÉ
Il y a un consensus que le développement de l’Afrique est confronté par plusieurs défis, qui incluent la pauvreté
et de chômage répandus, satisfaction en besoins alimentaires fondamentales pour les gens, contenir la pandémie
de VIH/SIDA, éliminer les disparités de sexe et garantir la gestion durable de ressources naturelles. Pour surmonter
le problème de l’offre alimentaire, les politiques d’investissement se sont focalisées sur les certaines denrées. Le
riz (Oryza sativa) a été au centre d’attention de politique particulière dans l’Afrique de l’ouest depuis les années
70, suivant la formation d’Association de Développement de Riz d’Afrique de l’ouest (WARDA). Bien que les
investissements substantiels et actions de politique ont été entrepris, les résultats contredisent les efforts faits et
espérances soignées. L’Afrique dépend toujours des importations à une échelle incroyables de riz et les produc-
tions de riz domestiques ont été principalement infructueuses. La question est: Qu’est ce qui n’a pas allé?
Pourquoi l’Afrique a-t-elle été incapable de produire assez de riz aux importations de tige?  Pourquoi les
investissements initiaux dans les arrangements et les programmes d’irrigation échouent ? Maintenant cette
attention est sur la culture de riz grandissant aux autres parties d’Afrique, quelle politique impérative est-il
essentiel pour garantir une production durable du riz ? Cet article examine ces problèmes en s’inspirant des
expériences de plusieurs pays à travers l’Afrique de l’Ouest. L’objectif général est de fournir le cadre de politique
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approprié pour l’expansion de riz aux nouveaux secteurs en Afrique et pour la production durable dans ces
nouveaux secteurs. En particulier, cet article examine certaines politiques poursuivies dans le passé par un
nombre de pays et les raisons pour leur inefficacité. En s’inspirant des bonnes expériences passées, cet articles
fait des propositions pour améliorer l’environnement de politique pour soutenir les nouvelles initiatives d’augmenter
la production de riz sur le continent.
Mots Clés:   La révolution verte, Oryza sativa,  l’Afrique de l’Ouest
INTRODUCTION
There is a consensus that Africa’s development
confronts several challenges, which include
alleviating widespread poverty and
unemployment, providing basic foods for the
people, containing the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
eliminating gender disparities and ensuring
sustainable management of natural resources.
Most of these problems are largely contemporary
as they did not constitute any concern for the
African leaders at independence (UNEP, 2005).
Food which today occupies a position of grave
concern was initially treated with benign neglect
as it failed to attract attention in the various
schemes and programmes designed to initiate a
rapid transformation of the economy and society
in each country (Onyenweaku, 1980). However,
it soon dawned on the leaders that food could be
taken for granted only at the peril of national
development. Certain events brought this reality
home more poignantly,  as we summarize below:
• The unprecedented OPEC threefold price
increases on crude petroleum in the early
1970s led to increased general price levels
worldwide and inevitably damaged the
already fragile economies of the developing
countries including those in Africa (World
Bank, 1986). What this meant was that existing
and prospective farm investors faced a high
cost production profile, while the prospect of
maximizing profits or earning remunerative
income was dimmed.
• There was a severe environmental problem,
the Sahelian drought of 1974, which
adversely affected agricultural production in
most of West Africa. Agricultural production
was particularly more precarious in countries
located along the fringes of the Sahel,
countries like Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso,
Niger and Chad. The repercussion was that
water shortages impaired irrigated and
lowland rice cultivation.
• Areas were expressing strong demand for
exotic food items including imported rice
which was found more palatable and more
easily handled than the more common coarse
grains. This necessitated increased
importation of various food items, particularly
dairy products and rice from the international
market.
What perhaps compounded the situation was the
initial policy orientation of all the emerging
independent countries in Africa. This was the
adoption of import substitution as strategy for
economic development. The strategy attempted
to replace imports with local production with the
purpose of conserving foreign exchange and
developing local entrepreneurial capacity
(Randolph and Edwin, 1995). Good intentioned
it certainly was, but the strategy was formulated
wrongly around the development of an urban
industrial production base. It was not surprising
that the strategy sooner rather than later
engendered overvalued exchange rates, inefficient
price controls, protectionist measures, high taxes
and a variety of subsidies, all of which had
negative impact on agriculture. There was also a
pervading illusion that because these countries
are resource-surplus, they automatically have
comparative advantage. Unsubstantiated claims
were, therefore, being made about the ability of
African countries to produce at a competitive cost
level. Having perceived the food problem as
capable of upturning the development efforts in
general, African countries decided to focus
deserved attention on food production with the
sole objective of achieving self -sufficiency in
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basic commodities and in the process stem the
huge outflow of scarce foreign reserves being
expended on food imports (Randolph, 1997).
The demand for rice (Oryza sativa) in sub-
Saharan Africa in general is growing much faster
than for any other grain with both the rich and
the urban poor relying on it as a major source of
calories (WARDA, 2003; 2004). Its production
and consumption have generally increased over
the years, from a status of mere occasional meal
to being a major staple. The Food and Agricultural
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)
submitted that the substitution of rice for coarse
grains and traditional roots and tubers has fueled
growth in demand at an annual rate of about 5%.
Urbanisation and changes in employment
patterns and life style are critical in consumer
behaviour patterns which seeks for more rice than
any other food grain. The preferential behaviour
of consumers has meant that social stability may
be impaired were rice to become suddenly
unavailable or unaffordable. What is generally
clear is that rice availability and rice prices impact
directly on the welfare of the poorest West
African consumers who are the least food secure
in the region. Because consumption runs ahead
of local production, imports have become
inevitable and occur at annual growth rate of
about 8%. In the early 1990s West Africa was
importing rice to the tune of about 2.6 million
metric tons annually, representing an estimated
$750 million in scarce foreign exchange being
taken away from the region. Since the beginning
of the new millennium imports have further
soared, with the FAO predicting that as much as
4 million tons of rice may be imported annually
into the region.
Against the above situation, it is not
surprising that production of rice from local
efforts has preoccupied policy makers in the
region for many years. This is more so because
of the suitability of most of the agro-ecological
and climatic regions of West Africa for rice
cultivation. Indeed, the establishment of the West
Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA)
in the early 1970s was to encourage research and
development efforts for increased rice
productivity in the region. However, in spite of
several rice-targeted integrated agricultural
programmes initiated in the countries, rice
production in the region is far from reaching the
self-sufficiency level that is envisaged and
planned. The situation has provoked numerous
socio-economic investigations and assessments
with the hope of identifying  the key problem
areas that need to be addressed. Often-times, the
policy environment is blamed for most of the
problems in the rice sector. It was even insinuated
that the peoples of West Africa have become
slaves to a commodity in which the region does
not have comparative advantage in producing.
What is certain is that in spite of policy actions
of governments in the region since the early 1970s
self-sufficiency in rice is far from being achieved
by virtually all the countries. The questions are:
What went wrong? Why has West Africa been
unable to produce enough rice to stem imports?
Why did the initial investments in irrigation
schemes and programmes fail? Now that attention
is on expanding rice to other parts of Africa, what
policy imperatives are essential to promote and
ensure sustainable rice production?
This paper examines these issues by drawing
on experience  from several countries across West
Africa. The overall objective is to provide
appropriate policy framework for the expansion
of rice to new areas in Africa and to make
production in such new areas sustainable.
CONCEPTUAL    FRAMEWORK
The primary goal of economic policies is to
achieve a balanced, self-reliant and dynamic
economy. In West Africa, considerable
expectation is nursed  that the agricultural sector
will  provide the platform for the take-off of the
economy. Invariably governments have
intervened in the sector through policy initiatives,
strategies and programmes to raise the capacity
of agriculture to help in the achievement of the
goal of a balanced, prosperous, non-inflationary
and progressive economy.  In most governments
agricultural policy entails a goal-driven strategic
planning designed to address agriculture-related
problems.   Thus, the key sector policies indicate
the path along which public conduct in
agriculture will be pursued. The policies are
targeted at achieving peace and harmony in the
society, promoting security and general well-
being of the people through alleviation of hunger,
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malnutrition, ill-health and poverty. Agricultural
policy implies roles, procedures, programmes,
institutions and budgets in pursuant of specific
courses of action.
Policy pronouncement or enactment is generally
targeted at macro, micro or sector-specific
purposes and it is used for four inter-related
purposes:
• Policies are used to chart a path for
development actions; this tends to make
public officials follow laid-down rules and
procedures rather than their own fancy and
preconceived notions;
• Policies establish entitlements and the goals
that are to be achieved; they make things clear
and remove ambiguity on the part of decision
makers;
• Policies provide a mechanism for the public,
the decision makers and implementing
agencies to articulate a course of action and
organize society’s scarce resources to achieve
public good; and
• Policies allow decision makers to establish
preferences and organize programmes in line
with available resources.
The framework for looking at rice policy in West
Africa may involve an examination of the various
objectives for rice production in the region, the
constraints facing the achievement of the
objectives, and the appropriateness of the various
policies enunciated to accelerate rice
development in the region. With respect to the
objectives, the member-countries of WARDA
nurse the attainment of self-sufficiency as part
of the broader goal of self-sufficiency in staple
food commodities. The case for the domestic
development of rice is attributed to the enormous
foreign exchange being expended in importation
of the commodity. If foreign exchange is saved
and sufficient rice is produced internally attention
could then shift to other commodities or sectors
of the economy which require investments.
Production of rice is targeted at generating
income for the farmers. It is known that the
majority of farmers produce rice mainly for the
market and not as a subsistence enterprise.
Indeed, farmers who could not produce the
traditional cash crops like cocoa, coffee, palm
produce, or cotton find solace in the production
of rice as a cash crop. A third objective derivable
from the income objective is the equitable
distribution of income with a view to ensuring
general welfare of all categories of farmers.
Arising from the determination of
governments in West Africa to promote
accelerated development of the rice sector, a
range of policy measures were instituted to
pursue this goal. The policies may be categorised
into three broad groups including, trade-related
policies, price and marketing policies and
investment policies. Trade policy measures
adopted at various times included restrictions (in
form of duties or quantitative controls), port
charges, subsidy on imports, taxes and trade
levies and other measures. The trade policies
caused the domestic prices of rice to diverge from
international prices. In most of the countries
government intervention in the trade sector
attempted to restrict imports in order to raise
domestic prices and through this process ensure
that farmers earn remunerative income from rice.
Production/Input policies either in the form
of taxes or subsidies affect prices of inputs used
in rice production and, therefore, the production
costs as well as the price of output. Inputs which
enjoyed substantial subsidies included fertilisers,
improved seeds, herbicides, pesticides,
agricultural machinery and equipment. Also,
farming services such as land clearing, irrigation,
farm credit and extension services were covered
by the general regime of subsidy support.
Investment policies are in the form of
subsidized capital creation in production, milling,
marketing and supporting infrastructure.
Investment policies produce similar effects to
those of input subsidies, although their effects
are for longer periods and tend to augment other
resources.
COUNTRY-LEVEL    RICE    POLICIES
The purpose of this section is to have a broad
view of the policies pursued by a number of West
African countries which have had extensive and
deep experience in rice production for many years.
It is appropriate to delineate the time perspective
of policy review into two periods, before and after
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the implementation of economic policy measures
termed structural adjustment programme (SAP).
This is necessary because SAP invariably  was
instituted to correct some of the anomalies
imposed on the economy and the production
sector by the very nature of policies pursued by
the national governments in the decade following
independence. The selection of the countries is
not systematic but decided purely on availability
of pertinent information for the analysis. Thus,
for the review of pre-SAP situation, Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali, Nigeria and Senegal are selected while the
post-SAP review covers more countries.
PRE-SAP    RICE    POLICIES
Cote d’Ivoire.  Cote d’Ivoire is essentially a
successful agricultural country, always touted as
an African success story in agricultural
development, that is, until the beginning of the
present debacle. The country was said to be self-
sufficient in rice in the 1970s (Humphreys, 1981).
The growth rate of rice output per annum was
about 5 per cent, promoted by government
policies which engendered supplies of improved
inputs, fertilisers, irrigation and mechanised
techniques. Rice was the only staple food crop
for which Cote d’Ivoire established a state
development company during the period. The
country emphasised four types of policies prior
to undergoing SAP (Commander, 1989). These
were research, institutional, investment and
pricing. The research policies focused on using
technological improvements to stimulate
increased output of rice. Taiwanese technical
experts were on hand to assist initiate viable small-
scale irrigation schemes and extension
programmes. Improved seeds obtained from India
and Philippines were introduced and research
helped to identify profitable production systems
and methods of development.
Institutional policies were tailored towards
effective input delivery and marketing of output.
SODERIZ initiated a contract system for the
supply of modern inputs such that the farmers
made payments in cash or paddy at the time of
harvests. A large array of inputs and services
was greatly subsidized, inputs and services such
as treated seeds, fertilisers, insecticides,
equipment, land development, extension services,
maintenance of irrigation works and
mechanisation were provided at a fraction of the
actual costs.
Investment policy took the form of long-term
capital development of irrigation projects in the
savannah zone to the north of the country as
well as the establishment of industrial-scale rice
mills. However, the development of irrigated lands
was below target, as only half of the area planned
was covered.
Trade and domestic price policies were geared
towards ensuring fair prices for local rice
producers and insulating producers and
consumers from divergent prices. But this was
difficult to sustain following fourfold increases
in world rice prices in the mid-1970s. There was
an inevitable corresponding upswing in domestic
prices which depressed demand dramatically
such that there were gluts in the market as a result
of previous imports that now could not be sold.
Senegal.  Senegal is more famous for groundnut
production and export. During the 1970s, the
country was a net importer of rice, consumed
mainly in Dakar (Randolph and Toure, 1995).
Domestic rice production comes mainly from the
Casamance region. The Senegalese government
had made efforts to stabilize consumer prices by
adopting an official price for rice. The official price
was defended with large quantities of imports.
Later rice policy was tuned towards expanding
domestic production under more secure water
control systems. The policy was supported with
extension activities, public investments in
irrigation projects, and input subsidies. That is
Senegal had no comparative advantage in rice
production except when it adopted animal traction
technique in production.
Mali.  The Malian state embarked on socialist
transformation of the economy and society in
the first decade of independence, 1960-1968. Mali
actually elected to pursue a Marxist system of
planning and, in effect, pursued policies of
nationalization, establishment of state industries
and commercial enterprises, and significant
public investments in transportation. The
government set up producer and consumer
cooperatives, outlawed private commerce and
established a group of state monopolies. The main
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objective of Malian agricultural policy at the time
was to supply cheap cereals to the urban
population in order to hold down wages and to
increase exports. Government original policy was
to set up collective fields in the villages with the
hope that the scheme would make agriculture
more productive. Other policy instruments were
a system of fixed producer prices, fixed consumer
prices and the establishment of state agencies –
Office des Products Agricoles du Mali (OPAM),
with legal monopoly on cereals trade and the
Societe Malienne d’Importation et d’Exportation
(SOMIEX), which had legal monopoly on the
marketing of export crops.
Over the years the Malian rice policy has been
to achieve self-sufficiency and improve security
of food supplies. Other objectives are to improve
rural incomes and raise the nutritional standard
of the population. The main goal of the first
Malian government, that is, to control the
production and marketing of cereals in order to
maintain low prices, was stepped down by the
military government that took over power in 1968.
The central instruments of policy then became
technical improvement and investment in rice
production in the Office du Niger and in the two
main rice projects at Segou and Mopti.
Results of a major study show that the Malian
rice sector had a strong comparative advantage
in the production of the commodity arising from
low labour and irrigation costs, fairly high paddy
yield and efficient milling (McIntire, 1981).
Efficient techniques were adopted by farmers
because the techniques were more privately
profitable than traditional rice production
techniques. The supply response of farmers
enabled the Malian government to achieve most
of the objectives of its rice policy, especially the
objectives to supply cheap rice to its urban
populations.
Nigeria.  Nigeria produces as much rice as the
rest of West Africa and imports as much as the
rest of the region. Although the per capita
consumption trails are below that of the sub-
region ( 29 kg per capita per annum as against 35
kg per caput per annum), Nigeria is experiencing
a very rapid consumption profile in rice with some
5 million metric tons being required on an annual
basis presently to meet increasing demand. Since
the mid-1970s domestic production has increased
annually at 10%, mostly by extensification.
Prior to reforms the Nigerian rice sector showed
certain characteristics, namely:
• fecundity of importation was pre-eminent and
unrestricted as to the sources or quality;
• government was directly involved in
distribution and marketing of imported rice
and , strangely,  was absorbing the
associated marketing costs;
• urban consumers were becoming
increasingly tuned towards consuming more
rice than ever before, as a result of significant
drop in domestic prices and the ease of
preparation as compared with local coarse
grains; and
• rice producers enjoyed some subsidy on
inputs but this was not sufficient to offset
the depression in output prices because of
cheap imports.
Rice imports became a sore point in the early 1980s
as a result of general economic depression of the
Nigerian economy and surfeit of foreign exchange
to sustain imports. Consequently, a total ban on
importation came into effect in 1985 and lasted
till 1995. In specific terms, Nigeria during this
period employed several trade policy measures
in the rice sector with the hope of raising domestic
production in order to stem imports. Trade policy
measures adopted included tariffs, restrictions
and outright bans. In the 1970s and early 1980s,
huge petroleum earnings coupled with an
overvalued exchange rate, facilitated cheap
imports which eroded the competitiveness of
local producers. With the ban on imports in 1985,
there was some incentive for farmers to increase
output but because locally-produced rice was of
such poor quality, there was no significant
demand for local rice. In point of fact, illegal
imports boomed.
Performance of the rice economy during pre-
SAP era.  What is obvious is that the policies
pursued in the early period of independence in
most rice-producing West African countries failed
Rice policy in Africa 229
to achieve the objectives of the various
governments. While the results of policies were
inevitable given the rather late attention paid to
the food sector, it was also clear that both the
objectives and the policies pursued were
conflicting. Providing cheap food for consumers
and remunerative income for producers could not
be achieved given the poor management and
execution of rice projects in most of the countries.
High productivity could not be assured resulting
in low rate of return of large-scale irrigation
investments against expectation and plans. The
policies failed to establish comparative advantage
in rice production in most of the countries (see
Table 1), tasking the wisdom of investing in rice
when other crops were showing better
performance.
The performance of the rice sector could not
be divorced from that of the entire agricultural
sector, which actually showed a depressed state
as a result of overvalued exchange rates of the
era and the policies of accumulation of
governments which taxed agriculture to generate
development funds for the entire economy.
Investments in agriculture were also a fraction of
the overall annual budgets in most of the
countries. Indeed, the entire national economy
was performing badly with huge debt, high rate
of inflation, stagnant growth, high
unemployment, instability in current accounts
and a generally depressed economy. The
economic and social conditions were poor, which
thus made structural adjustment inevitable as a
strategy to fix the economy.
POST-SAP    RICE    POLICIES
In the 1980s and early 1990s governments in West
Africa initiated macro-economic stabilization and
structural adjustment programmes to reinvigorate
their stagnant economies. The policy measures
under SAP emphasized the role of the market in
shaping economic development. What SAP did
was to eliminate state intervention in most
economic activities, and replace the state with
private sector. A battery of fiscal, monetary, wage
and incomes policies as well as trade and
exchange rate measures was introduced in most
of the countries that accepted adjustment loans.
The economic re-structuring affected the rice
sector in West Africa in a fundamental way,
initiating major reforms in the sector by redefining
its structure and policy environment. In the mid-
1990s WARDA evaluated the impact of the
programme in several countries including
Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and
Senegal. The group of studies confirmed that
reforms in the Sahelian and humid countries were
very extensive as they reduced the role of state
agencies in producing and purchasing paddy,
marketing rice and determining prices. The
reforms substantially increased  private sector
participation at each level of the domestic rice
marketing chain. Although changes had been less
dramatic in input and imported rice markets, SAP
significantly reduced producer incentives, left
consumer incomes unchanged and reduced call
on the national budgets. There was improvement
in competitiveness of local rice in relation to
imported rice and there was enhanced self-
sufficiency. The general changes observed in
selected indicators of performance, before and
after the implementation of SAP policy measures,
in six West African countries are as summarized
in Table 2.
WHY   RICE   POLICIES   IN   AFRICA
ACHIEVED   LITTLE   SUCCESS
 It is obvious from the analysis above that rice
policies in Africa have generally failed to secure
self-sufficiency, remunerative income,
employment and general welfare improvements
in the lives of rice producers. Although
governments in West Africa have injected
considerable resources towards increasing rice
production, the result, however, is that no single
country in the region could be said to be self-
sufficient and food secure in rice.  Although Mali
is said to have achieved self-sufficiency level,
the country has not depicted any features of a
country about to enter international or regional
trade in rice. The challenges of quality attributes
of Malian rice, packaging, storage capacity to
meet supply-demand flows as well as other trade
logistics including transportation indicate that
Mali is not yet ready to engage in rice trade. The
country nevertheless has demonstrated the
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TABLE 1.       Indicators of competitiveness for rice production in West Africa, 1981
Rice commodity system by country DRC Indicator
Traditional manual upland
Ivory Coast     forest 1.43
                       savannah 1.26
Liberia 1.78
Sierra Leone     north 0.87
                      south 1.09
Improved manual upland
Ivory Coast     forest 1.43
                      savannah 1.53
Liberia 1.99
Sierra Leone     south 0.82
                       North 1.13
Animal traction upland
Ivory Coast     savannah 1.41
Senegal (Casamance) 1.04
Mechanised upland







Ivory Coast     forest 1.75
                     Savannah 1.65
Liberia 1.44
Senegal     (Casamance) 1.26
Sierra Leone     south 0.82
                      North 0.94
Improved manual mangrove
Sierra Leone     south 0.74
                       north 0.98
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TABLE 1.   Contd.




Ivory Coast     forest 1.61
Liberia 1.69
Improved manual uncontrolled flooding
Sierra Leone     bolilands 0.72
Animal traction uncontrolled flooding
Mali 0.99
Mechanized uncontrolled flooding
Sierra Leone     bolilands 1.01
Animal traction controlled flooding
Mali 0.74
Improved animal traction controlled flooding
Mali 0.59
Improved animal traction irrigated single crop
Mali 0.59
Mechanized irrigated multiple crop
Senegal     Fleuve 2.35
Ivory Coast 2.99
Manual irrigated multiple crop
Ivory Coast     savannah 1.74
Senegal     Fleuve 1.41
Source:    Pearson et al. (1981)
capacity and capability of producing at self-
sufficiency level on a sustainable basis. Other
countries are perpetually producing barely half
of their requirements and are therefore major
actors in the international rice market as importers.
Some explanations can be offered for the slow
pace of rice production in Africa.
(a) There was misplaced priority arising from
initial contradictions witnessed at
independence when the new leaders adopted
an import substitution industrial strategy
without laying the new strategy upon local
agricultural raw materials in which the
continent has comparative advantage. This
caused unnecessary imports at the expense
of locally available raw materials. Curiously
little attention was paid to the food sector
on the wrong notion that food was available
and would continue to be available. But the
Sahelian drought, internecine wars and
political dislocations soon disrupted
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TABLE 2.     Indicators of competitiveness of rice production systems in West Africa after SAP
Country and year Rice commodity system                                                                                     DRC indicator
of study
Sierra Leone – 1995 Upland traditional, hand pounded, self consumption 0.53
Inland valley traditional, hand pounded, self consumption 0.52
Inland valley, dehuller, local market 0.89
Mangrove traditional, hand pounded, local market 0.27
Niger - 1995 Irrigated private, high input, dehuller, national market 0.91
Irrigated public, high input, dehuller, self consumption 0.38
Irrigated public, high input, dehuller, national market 0.57
Irrigated public, high input, industrial mill, national market 0.73
Senegal - 1996 Inland valley swamp, traditional, hand pounding, self consumption 1.11
Inland valley swamp, traditional, huller, self consumption 0.85
Irrigated public, direct seeding, mechanized harvesting, dehuller, national market 1.34
Irrigated private, direct seeding, mechanized harvesting, dehuller, national market 1.01
Irrigated private, direct seeding, mechanized harvesting, rice mill, national market 1.04
Irrigated private, direct seeding, mechanized harvesting, industrial mill, national market 1.28
Irrigated public, transplanting, dehuller, national market 1.52
Irrigated private, direct seeding, dehuller, local market 0.93
Irrigated private, direct seeding, industrial mill, national market 1.02
Source:   Randolph and  Edwin (1995); Randolph  and  Toure (1995); Randolph (1997)
agricultural production with dire
consequences on food supplies such that
several countries in the Sahel region had to
depend on significant food imports and food
aid. What this implies was that rice
programmes suffered from the lack of
adequate attention which was the bane of
food crops in general.
(b) Associated with the above factor were the
frequent changes in government as a result
of military coups across the continent. The
result of these changes had been changes in
emphasis and focus on the appropriate
strategies to feed the people. In Mali, for
instance, the leaders of the military junta that
came into power in 1968 came with new
policies, orientation and programmes for the
rice sector which de-emphasised the
objective of making rice available at low
prices for the urban population. In other
countries the changes in policy direction had
created lags in the implementation of
development programmes.
(c) There was no optimal policy mix. The price
as well as trade policies pursued were not
capable of effecting the desired changes in
the rice sector. The policies were frequently
being changed, even within the year as
shown in the case of Nigeria. This instability
in policy environment could not but create
an unstable investment environment for
producers and other stakeholders hoping to
explore the opportunities in the rice sector.
(d) In all the countries women are important
stakeholders in rice production, processing
and marketing. But technological
adaptations and practices fail to pay
sufficient attention to the needs of women
folk who perform most tasks on the rice farm.
Gender insensitiveness in technology
development obstructs efficiency and
performance. Men tend to receive more
attention even though their activities on rice
farms are not as elaborate as those of women.
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(e) The poor quality of local rice prevents
sufficient consumer demand which could
serve as a reason for increased production
by the farmer. While the discriminatory
consumer behaviour is quality induced, there
is little price differential between local and
imported rice to warrant consumers
sacrificing quality for the price incentive. The
transaction costs associated with local rice
are substantial because producing areas are
different from consuming centres.
(f) The reliance on exotic technology (fertilisers,
herbicides and pesticides) has contributed
to low output of rice in Africa. None of the
West African rice-producing countries has
sufficient capacity to manufacture its
requirement of chemical inputs nor to import
and distribute enough quantities of these
inputs. Associated problems concerning
inputs are the high prices and transaction
costs since these inputs are found only in
designated areas in urban locations which
farmers have to visit to make purchases.
(g) Lack of sufficient quantities of improved seed
rice to meet the planting needs of farmers
across various ecologies. This made a large
proportion of rice farmers to depended on
the traditional varieties which are of low
yield.
(h) The high demand for labour by rice activities
as compared with other staple crops which
farmers also cultivate, even at more lucrative
returns tends to discourage farmers from
expanding their rice holdings.
PROSPECTS   OF   AFRICAN    RICE
INITIATIVE
The African Rice Initiative is conceived as an
Africa-wide rice development plan, deriving its
strength from research  that must be anchored
on the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme (CAADP) of the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
That is, rice development in the continent must
reflect the goals of national and continental
development objectives of poverty eradication,
food security, and prosperous African economy
and society. These are clearly set out in the
NEPAD programme and are also embodied in the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). While
national programmes are necessary, regional
programmes and scaling up may move the
continent much faster in achieving the goals of
rice production in Africa. Thus, possibilities of
joint projects must be explored within the general
framework of achieving efficiency in resource
application. Regional cooperation would be
particularly important in providing support and
investment for water sector development,
infrastructure and access to crucial yield-
supporting inputs.
West Africa’s experience is symptomatic of the
challenges Africa as a whole may face in expanding
rice cultivation. Some of these challenges are
discussed as follows:
High production costs.  Current production costs
are high and do not make countries  competitive
in relation to imported rice. The challenge would
be to reduce costs in ways that make rice
production not only economically competitive but
also socially profitable. If this cannot be achieved,
then it makes economic sense to import rice.
However, the employment effects of local rice
production should not be lost on decision makers
and planners. Both the upstream and downstream
activities of rice production are labour demanding
and should create job opportunities for young
school leavers and other providers of labour. But
labour costs are high and account for nearly 80%
of farm costs across production ecologies.
Technology transfer has been generally slow and
ineffective and access to inputs and services is
constrained. Yields are low because of additional
problems  posed by iron toxicity, drought,
flooding and a pervading infestation of pests and
diseases.
Poor rice quality.  To a large extent the rice
produced in West Africa is of poor quality as a
result of several factors, including mixing of
varieties, inadequate processing, presence of
foreign bodies in supposedly clean rice, and
broken grains. The problem of quality arises as a
result of many actors in the rice production chain.
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TABLE 3.       Changes in selected indicators before and after reforms of the rice sector
Indicator                                                          Senegal        Mali            Niger   Mauritania        Nigeria       Cameroon
First structural adjustment programme initiated 1980 1982 1983 1985 1986 1988
Reforms in rice sector initiated 1985 1985 1984 1989 1987 1989
Total change in liberalisation score 3.4 4.6 2.5 6.2 1.3 3.0
Annual growth in domestic rice production
          Pre-SAP (%) 10 -24 21 18 7 9
          Post-SAP (%) 5 19 5 -2 15 -4
Real producer paddy price (LCU kg-1)
          Pre-SAP 72 52 69 19 1.5 93
          Post-SAP 83 67 76 16 1.5 46
Real fertiliser price (LCU kg-1 urea)
          Pre-SAP 56 109 45 20 0.4 50
          Post-SAP 90 131 54 21 0.5 9
Ratio of paddy price to fertilizer price
          Pre-SAP 1.5 0.5 1.6 1.0 7.5 1.8
          Post-SAP 1.0 0.5 1.4 0.7 3.2 1.0
Real consumer rice price (LCU kg-1)
          Pre-SAP 150 172 139 26 1.7 212
          Post-SAP 142 181 155 28 2.2 133
Annual growth in per capita rice consumption
          Pre-SAP (%) 1 13 11 9 -2  7
          Post-SAP (%) 0 0 2 -4 -6 9
Annual growth in rice imports
          Pre-SAP (%) 2 31 -8 7 -10 17
          Post-SAP (%) 2 10 6 2 5 6
Self-sufficiency ratio for rice (domestic
production divided by consumption)
          Pre-SAP (%) 18 63 46 21 67 45
          Post-SAP (%) 23 76 50 32 94 58
Government budget ( + = reduced burden) + + + + - +
Source:   Randolf (1993);   WARDA Annual Report (1993)
Most of the actors are  willing to accept the lapses
because there is no mechanism to transfer
rewards to quality at every stage of production.
New and old areas in Africa where rice production
is expected to increase would be advised to pay
sufficient attention to quality so as to secure
consumer confidence and demand for local rice.
Policy instability and uncertain market
environment.   Rice is now a structural component
of African diet. But past policies were unsure that
the rice profile would rise as high as it is today.
The food security role of rice was not as
emphasised as currently, the challenge being
simply to make rice available to urban elites. This
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limited the scope of the policy framework. But
much more, policies were poorly executed or not
executed at all. As a result policies failed to secure
a significant market share for local rice producers
and thereby created opportunities for imported
rice to permeate and dominate the market.
Instability in policy creates an uncertain market
environment and serves as a disincentive to
producers.
CONCLUSIONS
Rice has become a growth commodity in most of
West Africa and the demand for the crop is rising
faster than that of any food staple in the region.
Rice consumption and development is extending
to all other parts of Africa as a deliberate state
policy. This calls for a comprehensive policy
response. While rethinking the role of
governments, it must first be realised that the
individual governments still have a major role to
play in shaping the direction of rice development
in the continent. African governments must come
up with an optimal mix of policies which will
promote productivity, efficiency in resource
allocation and increased output. The issue of
subsidy is not whether to give or not give but to
determine in what particular instances is subsidy
necessary, in what form and at what level. Unless
the incentive structure is right, the farmers may
be tempted to consider alternative and more
profitable crops. The reality today is that the
African farmer has become much poorer than he
was at independence. He therefore deserves
significant support in his effort to supply
sufficient food, promote food security and reduce
poverty.
Partnerships must be developed with major
stakeholders in the rice sector. The NGOs, CBOs
and other groups, including agrochemical firms,
have specific roles to play. These must be
mobilized to aid the development of rice in the
continent. In this respect, the Africa Rice Centre
should be at the vanguard of the new initiative
given its centrality to the rice development and
research in the continent. The centre has all it
takes to play the major role and establish an
orderly, knowledge-based, progressive and
sustainable rice production in Africa.
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